In response to our Motion for Summary Judgment, the State claimed that, because we lacked “standing,” the court lacked jurisdiction to even hear the case. Their “argument” then leads them to a simple refusal to address any of the substantive issues raised by our Motion. Here’s the text of our rebuttal:
PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
RESPONSE
In his Response, Defendant’s Counsel makes the claim that this “lack of standing divests the Court of jurisdiction,” failing, apparently, to read Section 1.3 of the 2007 Inland Consent Decree, to wit: “The Court shall retain jurisdiction over the Parties and subject matter of this action to enforce this Decree.” Consequently, implementation of Section 1.3 is not dependent for its enforcement on anything other than the inherent power of the Court. So, despite the repeated, spurious, and vexatious “arguments” of the Defendant’s Counsel to the contrary, Plaintiffs wish to remind this honorable Court that they have argued repeatedly throughout the course of this case that they are not coming before the Court under the guise of their “standing” under the 2007 Inland Consent Decree. In fact, Plaintiffs have argued that, under Section 1.3 of the Consent Decree, the issue of “standing” is moot.
Consequently, Plaintiffs state, once more, that they seek relief under the US Constitution: Article VI, Clause 2; and the 14th Amendment.
The 1836 Treaty of Washington is the Supreme Law of the Land, and the Honorable Judge Maloney is bound thereby, and anything in MCL 324.2131 of the State of Michigan to the contrary notwithstanding. Article VI, Clause 2, US Constitution
The “usual privileges of occupancy” are fundamental rights inherent in the liberty of the Plaintiffs, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, American Indian Plaintiffs may not be deprived of those rights and that liberty. 14th Amendment, US Constitution
Recent Comments